Call for Papers: Suits and Spooks DC 2014 and Suits and Spooks Singapore 2014

Suits and Spooks DC is coming up on January 20-21, 2014 and Suits and Spooks Singapore will be March 20-21, 2014. The theme for both conferences will be on how companies can safely conduct business when they operate in what is essentially a digital battlefield. U.S. multinational firms not only have to contend with hacktivists targeting their websites and hacker groups stealing and selling their intellectual property. Their communications are being collected and monitored by most foreign intelligence services and insiders seem to be able to gain access to whatever they want.

If you've got an idea for a topic that fits this theme, please shoot me an email with a title and an abstract. Preliminary information on both events is available at the SuitsandSpooks.com website.

Add to Cart View detail

Open letter to President Obama on the eve of his Summit with President Xi

Dear President Obama,

I've spent the last five years working exclusively in the identification and cataloging of threat actors in cyberspace. I've participated in incident response investigations for some of the world's largest companies and have briefed both U.S. intelligence agencies and those of five foreign countries on the complexity of the cyber threat landscape as well as information warfare planning, research & development, and execution of strategy by both Russia and China. I host three highly regarded executive cyber security conferences each year, and my book Inside Cyber Warfare (in its 2nd edition) is used as a text by the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology in its cyber warfare certification program.

While I'm enthusiastic about your upcoming meeting with President Xi on mutual cyber security concerns, I'm worried that the strong anti-China sentiment on the Hill and in print by the New York Times, Bloomberg and the Washington Post will have a polarizing effect on your talks. Much of the evidence being touted as pointing to China's acts of cyber espionage is a conflation of multi-state and non-state actors engaging with the same target companies that China is interested in. I personally know of Russian hackers who prefer to attack their targets in different countries via a compromised Chinese computer because there are so many of them and they're so easy to exploit.

While there is a propensity among government officials and infosec experts to blame China first for any attack involving U.S. intellectual property, they often do so without any hard evidence. Chinese IP addresses don't qualify as evidence anymore than U.S. IP addresses do. Open source hacker tools written by Chinese developers and posted on the Web for anyone to download and use cannot be considered evidence of Chinese government involvement. And President Xi will certainly make the same point. While there's no question that the Chinese government engages in cyber espionage, it is not the only nation that does so and it is certainly not solely responsible for the estimated $300 billion in stolen U.S. IP.

Rather than accusing China of something that cannot be proved, I believe that U.S. interests can best be served by cooperating with China on the identification and prosecution of non-state actors who operate in Chinese and U.S. IP space. Media stories and self-serving infosec reports to the contrary, not all Chinese hackers work for the PLA. There are many independent hackers in China, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Taiwan and other countries who make money stealing IP and selling it to whomever is willing to pay. Some of these same hackers may be involved in attacking Chinese government websites; particularly those in India, Tibet, and Taiwan. While conventional wisdom groups hackers into silos (Russians rob banks; Chinese steal IP; Iranians attack power companies), that's not a realistic nor fact-based portrayal of the international cyber threat landscape.

There are many ways that China is benefiting from U.S. technology transfer such as their successful campaign to provide monetary incentives for U.S. multinationals to open R&D labs in Shanghai and Beijing (which now number over 1200). These labs employ Chinese engineers who learn U.S. technological secrets and then leave to work for Chinese companies; taking that proprietary knowledge with them. Those same employees have trusted access on their respective corporate intranets. There's no reason for the Chinese government to execute sloppy hacking operations against a U.S. company when that company has offices in Bejing or Shanghai. Access to their IP is a given.

If you and President Xi could reach an agreement to cooperate on reducing the activities of independent  non-state actors that have attacked both the U.S. and Chinese businesses and government organizations, it would benefit the U.S. in the following ways:

1. Chinese threat data is of great interest to U.S. law enforcement organizations.
2. A reduction of non-state actors currently cluttering up the threat landscape would make it easier to identify state-run cyber espionage operations.
3. The biggest threat to both Chinese and U.S. critical infrastructure is from non-state actors and, in the future, those may include terrorist groups. 

Mr. President, in my opinion, attempting to shame or threaten China over its hacking activities when the available evidence is so easily dismissed makes the U.S. look weak and ineffective. Enlisting China as an ally to identify and interdict the activities of independent threat actors would result in a win for both nations.

I hope this open letter finds it's way to your desk and that it helps inform your strategy.

Warm Regards,

Mr. Jeffrey Carr
CEO, Taia Global, Inc.
Author, Inside Cyber Warfare
Founder, Suits and Spooks conference

Add to Cart View detail

Critique of IP Commission's Cyber Security Recommendations

The National Bureau of Asian Research published (and assisted in writing) "The IP Commission Report: The report of the Commission on the theft of American intellectual property" (.pdf). The Commission members along with its purposes are as follows:

• Dennis C. Blair (co-chair), former Director of National Intelligence and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command 
• Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. (co-chair), former Ambassador to China, Governor of the state of Utah, and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative 
• Craig R. Barrett, former Chairman and CEO of Intel Corporation 
• Slade Gorton, former U.S. Senator from the state of Washington, Washington Attorney General, and member of the 9-11 Commission 
• William J. Lynn III, CEO of DRS Technologies and former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
• Deborah Wince-Smith, President and CEO of the Council on Competitiveness 
• Michael K. Young, President of the University of Washington and former Deputy Under Secretary of State 

The three purposes of the Commission are to:

• Document and assess the causes, scale, and other major dimensions of international intellectual property theft as they affect the United States 
• Document and assess the role of China in international intellectual property theft 
• Propose appropriate U.S. policy responses that would mitigate ongoing and future damage and obtain greater enforcement of intellectual property rights by China and other infringers 

IP and trade secret theft is a rapidly growing and very critical problem for U.S. companies. The IP Commission estimates the value of stolen IP from U.S. companies and government agencies at over $300 billion, which is about 75% of what the U.S. spends on R&D research each year.

While the report takes a deep and heavily annotated dive into the scale and scope of this problem, chapters 13 and 14 that detail the Commission's cyber security recommendations, have absolutely no footnotes whatsoever. In other words, there's no way to know who provided the commission with some very risky and questionable cyber security advice. So I called them.

I was told by the person who took my call that the cyber security experts wanted to remain anonymous, however she recommended that I speak with someone at the NBR. I sent a message via the NBR's information email account, read receipt requested, and watched it work its way up to Roy Kamphausen who confirmed that they spoke with "a wide array of cyber experts" but didn't mention any names.

Unfortunately, while much of the report is quite good, the cyber security advice ranges from problematic to potentially damaging. Here's my critique of that content. I'd be happy to debate it with anyone that the Commission spoke with.

1. No where in this report is mentioned the critical importance of first identifying a company's critical data or "crown jewels". It's a huge problem because most companies have no idea how to do this and the Commission never once mentions it.
2. Locking down a person's computer with a booby-trapped file has questionable legality but even worse, may result in the threat actor coming back to take more aggressive action against the targeted company. Remember Saudi Aramco? SA had to replace 2,000 servers thanks to a Wiper virus that only half worked due to some amateur coding mistakes. Remember HBGary Federal when its CEO threatened to "out" some members of Anonymous? There is no more HBGary Federal but Anonymous is alive and well. 
3. Recommending the passage of CISPA is both bad security advice and inserts a political agenda to an otherwise apolitical report.  
4. Threat-based deterrence is advocated for without being adequately defined. There are numerous ways that such a deterrence plan can have negative and unexpected consequences. And just like it's stupid to pick a fight with a stranger,  it's never a sound strategy to threaten an unknown adversary who can operate anonymously and holds the advantage.
5. Chapter 14 contains a back-handed recommendation to pursue three measures that constitute aggressive offensive action. The commissioners couched it in a bizarre manner by effectively saying that while we don't recommend these things at this time, if the situation doesn't improve, then they should be considered. The measures were for what's commonly called hacking-back, cutting funding to the World Health Organization, and raising tariffs on Chinese goods 150% higher than the amount of IP theft stolen by China. 

Considering how potentially bad if not operationally ludicrous some of these recommendations are, it's not surprising that none of the commission's cyber security experts wanted their names attached to the report. The topic of "active defense" or "hacking back" or "offense as defense" is an important one that needs broad discussion. In fact, I made it the focus of last February's Suits and Spooks DC conference and we'll address it again in La Jolla in two weeks. But it is rife with pitfalls and needs much more informed discussion and debate. The Commission really failed its audience in terms of the content of these last two chapters.

Add to Cart View detail

Chimera: Know The Targets

In today's digital landscape, threats are expanding and your intellectual property and trade secrets are their targets. You may not know the threat actor, but you can know what they're targeting.

CHIMERA will launch in the summer of 2013.

Add to Cart View detail

Closing the Loop: Part of an Assumption of Breach Security Paradigm

Tim O'Reilly gave a talk recently at Stanford University on the importance for startup companies to "close the loop" with their customers. Uber was used to demonstrate the concept. Both the Uber driver and the Uber customer know a lot about each other. They can track each other's location. The customer knows what the driver looks like as well as his license plate number. They can communicate with each other prior to the vehicle arriving. There's immediate feedback required on the customer's experience with the driver. There's almost no uncertainty in the entire service chain of an Uber hire. Uber has closed the loop with its customers.

As I listened to Tim speak, I immediately related it to the uncertain world of cyber security. Think of Uber as a U.S. corporation or government agency. Think of the Uber customer as the adversary state or non-state actor who's breaking in to steal valuable data. What cyber security tools "close the loop" between the two?

If you adopt an "Assumption of Breach" paradigm, then you've accepted that attackers may already be active in your network. Any tool which provides you with information on their movements in real-time "closes the loop". Then it just becomes a question of weighing cost against effectiveness and spending your dollars wisely on those tools.

Another way to close the loop with an adversary who's targeting your company or agency is to know what they want. This article in The Telegraph describes how MI-5 has issued a warning to British universities that their research on graphene and quantum computing is being stolen by Russia and China and, eventually, informing those countries' patent development work:

Researchers have already warned that work on graphene is moving abroad, with Britain funding extra research by our own academics but seeing their 54 patents outstripped by 2,204 from China.
Overall, cyber crime costs the UK £27billion per year, official figures suggest, with universities now identified as targets.
Researchers from Manchester, for instance, including academics Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov who won the 2010 Nobel Prize, have been warned that their servers could be targets. Graphene is a kind of two-dimensional carbon which is one of the thinnest, lightest, strongest and most conductive materials known to man. Identified only in 2004, it is harder than diamond, just a single molecule thick and conducts electricity.
Threats are posed both by hackers infiltrating UK university computers and from the theft of data from computers used by academics travelling abroad. 

My company, Taia Global, with financial support from our angel investors, is currently in development on a product which knows what the research priorities are in potential adversary states and can predict what will be stolen from our customers; thereby closing the loop between the victim and the thief and giving the victim time to take the necessary steps to protect those targeted documents. This is particularly useful when a company has millions of files, cannot protect all of them, and doesn't have a reliable way to classify those which are of value to an adversary or competitor.

Our product development cycle is currently in early Alpha. If you'd like to receive more information about this product as we get closer to beta, please contact us.

Add to Cart View detail

Who Are The Players in China's Targeting of Foreign Technology IP?

The release of Mandiant's APT1 report claimed that the PLA's Third Directorate (3PLA) is the responsible State organization behind Comment Crew (aka APT1). One of the things that the report's authors didn't do was demonstrate how the other State agencies who engage in this type of activity were excluded in their analysis. For future reference, here's a more complete list of the possible organizations who conduct intelligence activities (including cyber) to consider or rule out in terms of possible Chinese attribution.

Traditional Channels

Civilian

• The Ministry of State Security (MSS) - Counterespionage and Counterintelligence; Foreign Intelligence; Domestic Intelligence
• Ministry of Public Security (MPS) - National Police; Domestic Intelligence

Military

• Second Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department (2PLA): engages in foreign intelligence, imagery intelligence, and tactical reconnaissance
• Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA); engages in signals intelligence
• Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department (4PLA); engages in computer network operations
• Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department
• Intelligence departments of the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery
• State Secrecy Bureau

Non-Traditional Channels

• Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)
• Research Institutes
• PRC Military-Industrial Companies
• Organized Chinese hacker groups

Guidelines:

Failed operations. In Amy Elizabeth Brown's paper "Directed or diffuse?: Chinese human intelligence targeting of US defense technology", she makes the same point that I have made multiple times; e.g., that much of the information we have about Chinese espionage cases (cyber and otherwise) comes solely from failed operations - meaning covert operations that have been discovered. Therefore, we have to acknowledge the possibility that China also runs successful covert operations using more effective tradecraft but we don't know the scope or scale.
3PLA's distributed offices. It's important to note that 3PLA, which was identified in the Mandiant APT1 report has, according to Mattis, offices and technical reconnaissance bureaus in each of China’s seven military regions and several major cities (not only Shanghai).
OSINT is insufficient. Another important statement in Mattis' conclusions is that open sources are insufficient to understand the inner workings of these various intelligence agencies.
Lack of sound tradecraft. "One of the defining characteristics of China’s non-traditional techniques for obtaining technology, as observed in many of the cases noted here, is the lack of clandestine tradecraft, or even the most basic elements of operational security, involved in obtaining the information.  In general, it appears that little or no care is used to ensure that the operation goes undetected." - Amy Brown's "Directed or Diffuse" paper as referenced below.
Giving amateur operatives too much credit. "A belief that the Chinese rely on amateur operatives risks leading CI professionals to dismiss or be inattentive to the threat posed by China’s professional services." - Peter Mattis "The Analytic Challenge" paper as referenced below.
Distinguishing economic espionage from Chinese intelligence. "When economic espionage with no connection to the Chinese intelligence services is interpreted as “Chinese intelligence,” less attention will be paid to what those organizations actually do. The Chinese intelligence services and the Chinese defense industries are distinct entities, although they may sometimes work for mutual benefit." - Peter Mattis (Ibid)

Readers of the Mandiant report or any report that purports to reveal the inner workings of Chinese cyber espionage cases are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the papers referenced below as well as the above guidelines that I've extracted from them. 

For example, the lack of tradecraft by the three individuals mentioned in the Mandiant report is palpable, and was pointed out by the report's authors: "These actors have made poor operational security choices, facilitating our research and allowing us to track their activities. They are some of the authors of APT1's digital weapons and the registrants of APT1 FQDNs and email accounts. These actors have expressed interest in China's cyber warfare efforts, disclosed their locations to be the Pudong New Area of Shanghai, and have even used a Shanghai mobile phone number to register email accounts used in spear phishing campaigns." - Mandiant APT1 report, p. 51

Even if one assumes that the Chinese government is the customer for APT1's cyber espionage activities, it's important to consider all of the options before attempting to assign attribution. Such a lack of tradecraft involved deserves at least a mention in the report that non-traditional channels as defined above were considered. As this article points out, those options are plentiful within China, but also include other foreign intelligence services and professional hacker crews who run their operations from China and/or from Chinese servers in order to confound any efforts at attribution.

Reference Material:

The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services

Directed or diffuse?: Chinese human intelligence targeting of US defense technology

PRC Intelligence Apparatus - Implications for Foreign Firms

Related Posts:

"Mandiant APT1 Report has critical analytic flaws"

Add to Cart View detail

Mandiant APT1 Report Has Critical Analytic Flaws

Mandiant's APT1 report is the latest infosec company document to accuse the Chinese government of running cyber espionage operations. In fact, according to Mandiant, if a company experiences an APT attack, then it is a victim of the Chinese government because in Mandiant-speak, APT equals China.

"We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive" 

- Richard J. Heuer, "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis

The fact that Mandiant refuses to acknowledge that other nation states engage in cyber espionage when the facts show otherwise demonstrates what Heuer calls an "expectation bias", but it's much worse than that.

Mandiant's alleged proof is summarized in Table 12 (pp. 59-60): "Matching characteristics between APT1 and Unit 61398". Mandiant's entire premise that APT1 is PLA Unit 61398 rests on the connections made in that table and that no other conclusion is possible:

"Combining our direct observations with carefully researched and correlated findings; we believe the facts dictate only two possibilities: Either a secret, resourced organization full of mainland Chinese speakers with direct access to Shanghai-based telecommunications infrastructure is engaged in a multi-year, enterprise scale computer espionage campaign right outside of Unit 61398’s gates, performing tasks similar to Unit 61398’s known mission or APT1 is Unit 61398." (APT1, p. 60)

If this report were written by a professional intelligence analyst at CIA, it would most likely undergo a vetting process known as ACH (Analysis of Competing Hypotheses):

"Analysis of competing hypotheses, sometimes abbreviated ACH, is a tool to aid judgment on important issues requiring careful weighing of alternative explanations or conclusions. It helps an analyst overcome, or at least minimize, some of the cognitive limitations that make prescient intelligence analysis so difficult to achieve."

In other words, ACH forces the intelligence analyst to look for all alternative hypotheses and assess them one at a time to see which best fits the data collected. This is rarely if ever done by information security companies, and it's the single biggest objection that I have when it comes to individuals making claims of attribution to nation states. Heuer's iconic "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" explains why ACH is so important:

"The way most analysts go about their business is to pick out what they suspect intuitively is the most likely answer, then look at the available information from the point of view of whether or not it supports this answer. If the evidence seems to support the favorite hypothesis, analysts pat themselves on the back ("See, I knew it all along!") and look no further. If it does not, they either reject the evidence as misleading or develop another hypothesis and go through the same procedure again. Decision analysts call this a satisficing strategy. (See Chapter 4, Strategies for Analytical Judgment.) Satisficing means picking the first solution that seems satisfactory, rather than going through all the possibilities to identify the very best solution. There may be several seemingly satisfactory solutions, but there is only one best solution." 

"Chapter 4 discussed the weaknesses in this approach. The principal concern is that if analysts focus mainly on trying to confirm one hypothesis they think is probably true, they can easily be led astray by the fact that there is so much evidence to support their point of view. They fail to recognize that most of this evidence is also consistent with other explanations or conclusions, and that these other alternatives have not been refuted."

If Mandiant or another organization were to use ACH on this evidence, here's how Heuer recommends it be done. It's an 8-step process:

1. Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.
2. Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.
3. Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side. Analyze the "diagnosticity" of the evidence and arguments--that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.
4. Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.
5. Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis. Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.
6. Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence. Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.
7. Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not just the most likely one.
8. Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected.

I don't have the time to run Mandiant's evidence through an ACH process but I'd like to propose that a volunteer group of intelligence students at Mercyhurst Institute of Intelligence Studies do that very thing. My friend Professor Kris Wheaton who teaches there and writes the outstanding Sources and Methods blog is an expert in this area and I'm hopeful that he'll pick up the challenge.

In the meantime, the following table has four columns. The first three are from Mandiant's table 12. The "Other" column contains a partial group of alternatives that I've provided for each of Mandiant's "characteristics". These alternatives need to be analyzed and ruled out using a rigorous analytic process like ACH before Mandiant or anyone else can claim that APT1 is a part of China's Peoples Liberation Army.

In summary, my problem with this report is not that I don't believe that China engages in massive amounts of cyber espionage. I know that they do - especially when an executive that we worked with traveled to Beijing to meet with government officials with a clean laptop and came back with one that had been breached while he was asleep in his hotel room.

My problem is that Mandiant refuses to consider what everyone that I know in the Intelligence Community acknowledges - that there are multiple states engaging in this activity; not just China. And that if you're going to make a claim for attribution, then you must be both fair and thorough in your analysis and, through the application of a scientific method like ACH, rule out competing hypotheses and then use estimative language in your finding. Mandiant simply did not succeed in proving that Unit 61398 is their designated APT1 aka Comment Crew.

UPDATE (22 FEB 2013): I've published a follow up to this article: "More on Mandiant's APT1 Report: Guilt by Proximity and Wright-Patterson AFB"

Add to Cart View detail